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357 Tully Street  
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## Executive Report

### JSOU Second Annual Symposium

IW: Strategic Utility of SOF

30 April–3 May 2007, Hurlburt Field, FL

| Report Documentation Page  |                                    |                                     |   | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188                  |                                 |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. |                                    |                                     |   |   |                                 |
| 1. REPORT DATE<br><b>2007</b>  |                                    | 2. REPORT TYPE                      |   | 3. DATES COVERED<br><b>00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007</b> |                                 |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><b>JSOU Second Annual Symposium IW: Strategic Utility of SOF</b>  |                                    |                                     |   | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                 |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |   | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                    |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |   | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                          |                                 |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)   |                                    |                                     |   | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                  |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |   | 5e. TASK NUMBER                                     |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |   | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                |                                 |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br><b>Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, FL, 32544</b>   |                                    |                                     |   | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER            |                                 |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  |                                    |                                     |   | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                    |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |   | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)              |                                 |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br><b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>  |                                    |                                     |   |   |                                 |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES<br><b>Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Second Annual Symposium, held in Hurlburt Field, FL, 30 April - 3 May 2007</b>  |                                    |                                     |   |   |                                 |
| 14. ABSTRACT   |                                    |                                     |   |   |                                 |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS  |                                    |                                     |   |   |                                 |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  |                                    |                                     | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT<br><b>Same as Report (SAR)</b> | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES<br><b>38</b>                    | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT<br><b>unclassified</b>   | b. ABSTRACT<br><b>unclassified</b> | c. THIS PAGE<br><b>unclassified</b> |   |   |                                 |





## Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational priorities:

- Preempting global terrorist and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats
- Enhancing homeland security
- Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conventional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries
- Conducting proactive stability operations
- Executing small-scale contingencies.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

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*Executive Report*

*JSOU Second Annual  
Symposium*

*Irregular Warfare:  
Strategic Utility of SOF*

*30 April – 3 May 2007*

*Hurlburt Field, Florida*

*The JSOU Press  
Hurlburt Field, Florida  
2007*



Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-2765; FAX 850-884-4732.

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This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-20-2

The symposium was an academic exercise; the views of the participants are their individual perspectives and do not represent the U.S. Government or their respective organizations.

## ***Recent Publications of the JSOU Press***

**Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks**,  
October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

**Logistic Support and Insurgency**, October 2005,  
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

**Dividing Our Enemies**, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

**The War on Terrorism**, December 2005, James A. Bates

**Coast Guard SOF**, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

**Implications for Network-Centric Warfare**, March 2006,  
Jessica Glicken Turnley

**Narcoterrorism in Latin America**, April 2006,  
Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

**The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future  
Conflict, and Implications for SOF**, April 2006, John B. Alexander

**Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education**,  
May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr.

**Blogs and Military Information Strategy**, June 2006,  
James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

**2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays**, June 2006

**Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)**

**One Valley at a Time**, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III

**Special Operations Aviation in NATO**, September 2006,  
Richard D. Newton

**Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and Counter-  
terrorism in Morocco**, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

**Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise**,  
December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr.

**Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community**,  
January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

**The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.**,  
February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

**Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project**,  
March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

**2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays**, April 2007

**Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist  
Operations**, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

## Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Strategic Studies Department held its second annual academic symposium on “Irregular Warfare: The Strategic Utility of Special Operations Forces (SOF)” in May 2007. This topic is relevant based on the ongoing worldwide conflict and the emphasis that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review places on irregular warfare.

The symposium presentations and discussions clearly showed no current consensus exists on the topic of irregular warfare. Some participants embraced it as a new, more effective way to describe the long-term conflict for which the U.S. and its partners are engaged, while others challenge whether it is even a type of warfare. These disagreements aside, a consensus was achieved concerning the need to emphasize our opponents’ “logic of action” versus their tactics. In other words, what do our opponents in the current conflict hope to gain—what are their goals? By overemphasizing the enemy’s use of terrorism as a tactic, we may not be harnessing our national power properly to defeat their long-term objectives.

Once we obtain a better and more in-depth understanding of our opponents, the greatest challenge is to develop U.S. and its partners’ long-term capabilities to defeat the enemy. As the term implies, irregular warfare is not traditional major-combat operations, and the military’s role in it is significantly different. Ultimately, winning in irregular warfare is achieved by winning control and allegiances of populations. In this situation—kinetic, violence is of limited value. Engagement and capacity-building is ultimately more effective, but these actions require a long, continuous process that is difficult, given America’s predilection for short, rotational engagement activities and operations.

Although the symposium may have raised as many questions as it answered, it is through discussing and arguing these issues that the Department of Defense (DoD), as our nation’s military arm, will come to develop the best capabilities to win this Long War. However, DoD will not prevail in an irregular war by itself. The next, and perhaps more challenging problem set, is how will the rest of the U.S. Government rise to the challenge facing the U.S.? Will the DoD’s interagency partners adapt their organizations, skill sets, and procedures to more



effectively participate in irregular warfare or will the traditional view of warfare as primarily or solely a military activity continue to prevail?

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF  
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

# Symposium Agenda

## Monday, 30 April

0800–1400 Pre-Symposium JSOU Fellows Meeting

## Tuesday, 1 May

0815–0825 Opening Remarks

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, president, JSOU and director, Center for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

0825–0845 Keynote address

*Validity of Irregular Warfare (IW) as a Model* and discussion  
Mr. Wade Ishimoto, senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

0915–1115 Panel 1, *Validity of IW as a Model* and discussion

Moderator: Dr. Harry R. Yarger (Colonel, USA, Ret.), professor of National Security Policy, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College

Panelists:

Colonel Mark Boyatt (USA, Ret.), former commander of 3rd Special Forces Group and assistant commandant of the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Special Warfare Center and School  
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hasler (USA), Joint and Army Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School

Dr. David Tucker, associate professor, Department of Defense Analysis and co-director of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School

Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro (Brazilian Army, Ret.), former commandant of the Combined Arms School and third deputy chief of staff of Doctrine, Plans and Strategy, Brazilian Army General Staff

Dr. Michael Vlahos, senior staff member, National Security Assessment Team of the National Security Analysis Department, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

1130–1240 Luncheon speaker

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (USMC, Ret.), author of *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century*, numerous articles, and opinion pieces and currently reading for Doctor of Philosophy degree in Modern History at Oxford University

- 1300–1515 Panel 2, *SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015* and discussion  
 Moderator: Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (USA, Ret.), founding director of the Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism Studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University and former chair of the Department of Social Sciences and founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point  
 Panelists:  
 Colonel Walter M. Herd, former commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan and current commander of the U.S. Army Accessions Support Brigade  
 Colonel David Hopley (U.K. Royal Marines, Ret.), former commander of the British Special Boat Service as well as deputy commander and component commander of U.K. Special Forces  
 Colonel Raymond Palumbo (USA), director, J5 Strategy, Plans and Policy, Center for Special Operations (CSO), USSOCOM  
 Colonel Chris Sorenson (USA), chief, J32 Special Operations Division, Operations Directorate, United States Northern Command
- 1545–1645 Keynote address  
*The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW* and discussion  
 Brigadier General Leslie L. Fuller (USA, Ret.), former commander Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, commander Special Operation Command-Europe (SOCEUR), and chief of staff for NATO Forces in Afghanistan

### **Wednesday, 2 May**

- 0800–1115 Panel 3, *The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW* and discussion  
 Moderator: Colonel James F. Powers, Jr. (USA, Ret.), director, Office of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  
 Panelists:  
 Ms. Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, president and chief executive officer of LEG, Inc. and former Director for Combating Terrorism, White House National Security Council staff  
 Ambassador Timberlake Foster, foreign policy advisor to the commander, Air Force Special Operations Command

Mr. Prakash Singh, former director general of Border Security Force, India

Colonel Robert B. Stephan (USAF, Ret.), Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

1130–1300 Luncheon speaker

Dr. John B. Alexander (Colonel, USA, Ret.), author of *The Warrior's Edge*, *Future War*, and *Winning the War* and currently a private consultant

1315–1445 Breakout sessions 1 and 2

1500–1600 Keynote address

*SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015* and discussion  
Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson (USN), deputy commander,  
USSOCOM

1615–1700 Breakout session 3

### **Thursday, 3 May**

0830–1130 USSOCOM CSO Update (Secret)





# Key Insights

- The term “irregular warfare” is often a barrier to understanding in our present fight because we fail to distinguish adequately between the method (i.e., tactic) and logic of action.
- The Department of Defense (DoD) approved definition for IW is as follows:

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

- IW is generational warfare and requires a long-term continuous engagement, especially prior to conflict. The key is how one stays engaged—for example, for generations with 1-year rotations, the interagency process, or domestic popular support.
- Clearly, in order to win the population’s support, the tasks found in IW are much broader and larger than a military solution or lead. It will require the U.S. and its allies to harness all of the elements of national power to be successful. Unfortunately, not all of the DoD or the interagency supports, yet alone embraces, the concept of IW.
- Examples of key concepts follow: Do nations wage IW, defend against it, or do both? Do the interagency and our coalition partners “buy into” the concept? How do the instruments of National Power fit into the model? Should our SOF operate inside the homeland to defeat a determined enemy? How do we conduct horizontal and vertical coordination in this multi-lateral, multi-agency environment? Do we need a super National Security Council for coordination? Is a Goldwater-Nichols-like legislative event needed to make the U.S. interagency system work?



## Introduction

The JSOU Second Annual SOF Strategic Symposium 1-3 May 2007—Irregular Warfare: Strategic Utility of SOF—attracted 111 participants. The event was designed to present and discuss issues relevant to the special operations community with perspectives from experts on the IW theme. A vigorous dialogue was maintained throughout the symposium, giving participants much to consider as they returned to their organizations to continue working the issues.

The symposium was framed by three keynote speakers, addressing the validity of IW as a model, experiences in the interagency process, and perspectives on SOF in the global security environment out to 2015. Three panels provided the substance and framework for the discussions and some thoughts for a way ahead. The panels were followed by successful “breakout” groups for more detailed discussion and input. In addition, two eminent authors offered perspectives on IW and other relevant topics during less formal lunchtime discussions. This report summarizes the high points of the keynote addresses, panel discussions, and luncheon speakers in order to stimulate the thinking of national security professionals and leaders of SOF who could not attend the symposium. JSOU would like to thank all who participated in this year’s event and is confident that participation was professionally rewarding for all.

JSOU president, Brigadier General Steven Hashem, opened the symposium with the USSOCOM perspective. He believes that IW is extremely relevant to USSOCOM, DoD, and the entire U.S. Government. Brigadier General Hashem briefly discussed the Quadrennial Defense Review’s point that “In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies, and its partners.” With the decreased likelihood in the near to mid-term of conducting major conventional combat operations, the challenge is for the U.S. to develop capabilities that address the more nebulous aspects of winning a long-term, irregular war. This goal will require an indirect approach with protracted operations conducted on a global scale and focused on the will or support of the people. Brigadier General Hashem highlighted that SOF already embrace these concepts and ideas, making USSOCOM a natural fit to support the idea of IW.

Clearly, in order to win the support of the host nation’s population and sustain U.S. domestic support for the effort, the tasks found in IW

are much broader and larger than solely a military solution or lead. It will require the U.S. and its allies to harness all of the elements of national power to be successful. Unfortunately, not all of the DoD or the interagency supports, let alone embraces, the concept of IW. Brigadier General Hashem concluded that the discussion, ideas proposed, disagreements, and perspectives of symposium participants are important to USSOCOM staff and senior leadership as they wrestle with the Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CCSO) and as the CSO synchronizes the current fight. The symposium IW topic and input of participants are invaluable to SOF and key to success in the Global War on Terror.

## Symposium Presentations and Discussion

### Mr. Wade Ishimoto, Keynote Address:

#### *Validity of Irregular Warfare (IW) as a Model*

Mr. Ishimoto qualified his remarks as his personal opinion, not those of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). His address focused on four major topics:

- a. Definition of IW
- b. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) IW Special Study
- c. The ten IW activities described in the IW Special Study
- d. Other hurdles facing the DoD in relation to IW.

Mr. Ishimoto began his discussion on the validity of IW by first sharing various definitions and acronyms that have proliferated throughout the government and how that forces others to learn a new concept. Likewise, IW may have much in common with other definitions used within the government, such as *unconventional warfare* (UW). The introduction of IW creates additional confusion. For the purpose of discussion, Mr. Ishimoto introduced the *Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare Roadmap* definition approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England in February 2006:

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of under-mining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

Mr. Ishimoto described the challenges that USJFCOM faced as they conducted and published the IW Special Study in August 2006. For example, neither the National Security Strategy nor the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism mention IW. Working definitions are not harmonized, coordinated and are often contradictory. USJFCOM also concluded that how IW differs from UW is unclear. The USJFCOM IW Special Study did describe 10 activities, however, which Mr. Ishimoto highlighted with some caveats:

- a. Insurgency and counterinsurgency
- b. Terrorism and counterterrorism



- c. UW—SOF support to General Purpose Forces
- d. Foreign internal defense (General Purpose Forces role)
- e. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
- f. Transnational criminal activities (not for General Purpose Forces)
- g. Civil military operations
- h. Psychological operations
- i. Information operations (Quadrennial Defense Review IW does not affect IO)
- j. Intelligence and counterintelligence.

Mr. Ishimoto also gave three questions for symposium participants to consider in discussions and future study: Do we wage IW, defend against it, or do both? Does the interagency buy into the concept? How do the instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) fit in?

### **Panel 1, *Validity of IW as a Model***

*Moderator: Dr. Rich Yarger (Colonel, USA, Ret.)*

The role of this first panel was to challenge the symposium participants' thinking as to what the IW model is or is not and what needs to be known about IW in order to understand SOF's strategic utility in such an environment. Panelists were invited to examine and offer perspectives on the validity of IW as a model by contemplating: What is it, what might it be, what is it not, or what should it be? Both theoretical and practical standpoints were presented. In general, panelists concluded that IW is a useful model, but the SOF and conventional communities must develop a better appreciation of what IW is and what it means to wage IW.

*Colonel Mark Boyatt (USA, Ret.)—Validity of IW as a Model*

As background information, Colonel Boyatt introduced four key documents and studies concerning IW: *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* and *Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM; *Irregular Warfare Special Study*, 4 August 2006; and the USMC/USSOCOM *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare*, Version 2, 2 August 2006. For discussion purposes, he used the working definition that Mr. Ishimoto had shared from the IW Roadmap.

From Colonel Boyatt's perspective, IW is not a model but rather an umbrella, an attitude, or a context of thinking. He believes that rather than require a definition, think of IW as a "basket" in which to

put anything that is not “regular” and helps separate ideas/concepts. It includes a collection of “tools,” which he defined as the 10 aspects outlined in the USJFCOM IW Special Study. IW is essentially warfare for the “human terrain,” and to be successful one has to be engaged for at least a generation, vice hours, days, or even years. Boyatt described it as *generational warfare*. The key is how one stays engaged—for example, for generations with 1-year rotations, the interagency process (which should not be led by DoD), or domestic popular support. His solution is depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Campaigning

The strategic end state must be clearly defined. This end state should lead to a strategic campaign plan with a series of short-term, achievable, interagency agreed-upon tactical level goals. The tactical goals are geared to the rotations of units and individuals (including the interagency support mechanisms) that build over the course of years to achievable operational level goals. The operational goals ultimately support and finally achieve the desired strategic end state.

Colonel Boyatt concluded that the strategic utility of SOF in IW lies in the understanding that IW is generational warfare and requires long-term continuous engagement, especially prior to conflict. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs are designed, organized, trained, and equipped for long duration engagement. The other elements of SOF provide support on-call with short duration or situational shaping engagements in support of Special Forces and Civil Affairs. The Special Forces mission is to accomplish goals and objectives *by, with, through*

indigenous or surrogate elements in a manner that is perceived as legitimate and moral.

*Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hasler, USA—Conventional, Irregular, and Unconventional Warfare*

CW4 Hasler described the doctrinal divide within the SOF community regarding terminology. Words do matter and often one term becomes confused with another; the definition of a term is sometimes confusing, and all terms are usually misused in discussions and context. From October 2006 to January 2007, Army SOF conducted an analysis of the terms concerning "war," how they relate to each other, and their expression or characterization in current joint and Army doctrine. Terms that were discussed included conventional, unconventional, regular, irregular, traditional, nontraditional, symmetric, asymmetric, fourth generation, unrestricted, insurgency, resistance, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

The purpose of the effort was to achieve better clarity and understanding of the terms and how they relate to each other, especially the relationship of UW to IW. Army SOF is the functional proponent for UW (a core task) but not for IW. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), development of IW and counterinsurgency doctrine, and the widespread misuse of military doctrinal terms was causing confusion inside and outside of Army SOF. Doctrine matters for three reasons: a) terms are easily manipulated, b) agreed-upon meanings of terms have serious mortal and organizational consequences, and c) terms connote organizational heritage and purpose, which stakeholders value and attempt to safeguard. The development of IW initially seemed to be redundant with much of Army SOF extant capabilities and possibly threatened core Army SOF roles and missions. Two indicators of this redundancy follow:

- a. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review significant theme of IW appeared to suggest a future that morphed Army SOF away from traditional roles
- b. Seven of 14 IW component activities already existed or were broken out from core Army SOF tasks.

The following definitions were used to better clarify joint and Army doctrine:

- a. **Conventional or traditional warfare** is a form of warfare *between states* that employs *direct* military confrontation to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or *seize or retain territory* in order to force a change

in an adversary's government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an *adversary's* government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are nonbelligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments will impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to *minimize civilian interference* in those operations. — IW Joint Operating Concepts Version 1.0 (Final Draft), February 2007 recommended definition

- b. **Irregular warfare** is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for *legitimacy and influence over the relevant population*. — Office of Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff, 1 December 2006
- c. **Unconventional warfare** is operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a *resistance* movement, an *insurgency*, or *conventional* military operations. — Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 23 January 2007
- d. **Foreign internal defense** is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by *another* government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. — Joint Publication 1-02, Field Manual 3-24
- e. **Counterinsurgency** is those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions *taken by a government* to defeat an insurgency. — Joint Publication 1-02, Field Manual 3-24

*Dr. David Tucker—IW and the Strategic Utility of SOF*

Dr. Tucker provided his views on the idea of IW and explained how it can be used to describe the strategic utility of SOF. Conflict, especially in the realm of IW, takes place amongst a population, which makes SOF roles and missions particularly important. Conventional warfare is usually conducted according to certain rules or conventions and against “similar” opposing conventional forces. These warfare conventions are very explicit on how people kill each other and what is or is not a valid target. However, conventions do change over time based on several factors, such as the lethality of weapons, new technology and tactics, and capabilities between opponents. For example, people who lack the power to compete conventionally against their enemy usually have to use other means, whether it is called “unconventional warfare”

or “irregular warfare.” Therefore, to see the strategic utility of SOF, one should take the concept of IW and tie it into the roles and missions of SOF as it applies to two distinctive sets:

- a. SOF conducting operations unilaterally vice operations in the support role to General Purpose Forces
- b. Whether it is a direct action mission or an indirect mission conducted through the population (by, with, through).

Dr. Tucker examined the strategic utility of SOF under both of these conditions. He concluded that SOF in the support role (to conventional forces) was not maximizing their strategic utility. It is clearly not the most unique and certainly not a strategic level contribution. Likewise, the direct missions that SOF conducts unilaterally are also not capitalizing on SOF’s strategic utility. The capture or killing of high value targets are of limited strategic utility and are not crucial to success. However, the conduct of independent, indirect missions is where the strategic utility of SOF makes the greatest impact. SOF’s greatest contribution to IW is following the indirect approach that capitalizes on the SOF serviceman’s maturity, unique training, local knowledge, cultural sensitivity, and rapport with the population. Therefore, the SOF strategic utility in the future should increase in relation to their employment in IW.

*Major General Alvaro Pinheiro (Brazilian Army, Ret.)—Validity of IW as a Model*

General Pinheiro initially qualified his remarks as his personal opinions, not the official position or policy of the Brazilian government. He focused on the following key points:

- a. Controversies between Clausewitz’s theory and IW
- b. Terrorism and urban warfare
- c. Offensive operations against irregulars
- d. Intelligence in IW
- e. Human dimension in IW
- f. Leadership in IW.

Many armies of the world are largely influenced by the thoughts of General Carl von Clausewitz. Some have concluded that it does not matter if the conflict is largely of a regular or irregular character; they are both governed by exactly the same concepts if viewed strategically. Major General Pinheiro shared that this way of thinking is dangerous; and in an IW environment, a tactical failure very often has dangerous strategic consequences. One must understand the changing



environment of conflict, especially the Clausewitz concept of a Center of Gravity.

The Center of Gravity concept—"the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends"—was developed during the early 19th century. However, modern life has changed significantly and is based on a system of systems that include national and local governments, law and order, media, society, economy, and the military. All of these systems have a virtual or physical Center of Power, which is not exactly a Center of Gravity. In an IW context, these Centers of Power vary in size and importance according to the type of operation and the particular operational environmental conditions. Often, the national Center of Gravity has moved into a big city. Because "irregulars" recognized long ago that they could not compete with conventional military combat power and technologies, they chose other domains and spheres of influence that could give them a significant advantage, such as urban areas.

The links between terrorism and urban warfare are very strong and must be understood. Today most terrorist organizations and resources are found in cities. Their targets are also in the cities, and the terrorists use the city systems to their advantage. Therefore, the GWOT has all the urban warfare ingredients. Some key considerations for offensive operations against irregular forces in this environment follow:

- a. Build mixed forces that are small, agile, and lethal.
- b. Gain and maintain the initiative, using all dimensions of national power to keep proactive and constant pressure.
- c. Understand that one cannot play nice; it is a battle to kill.
- d. Use relevant force but prevent inappropriate use of physical violence to maintain and demonstrate high moral standards.

Intelligence is also crucial to any successful campaign against irregular forces. Perhaps more than ever, intelligence drives operations. In IW, the levels of intelligence are blurred; the focus is clearly on the tactical level; requirements for coordination and sharing are high at all levels; and human intelligence (HUMINT) prevails over all other methods of intelligence collection—for example, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).

The greatest and most constant factor in IW is the human dimension. IW is essentially "psycho-social warfare." Learning to deal with the human and cultural complexities is the key point. It includes infinite patience and a cultural awareness that is more than a rudimentary language capability. Cultural awareness is absolutely

essential and is truly a force multiplier. Soldiers must understand that winning the acceptance of the local populace will enhance their intelligence collection, and building these bonds of trust offers more force protection than body armor.

With respect to leadership in an IW environment, leaders at all levels must be capable of facing a conventional enemy one moment, then shifting to an irregular threat the next, before transitioning to providing reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the establishment of local governance. All of these tasks must be performed by the same commander simultaneously. “Winning the peace” is as important as “winning the war.”

Major General Pinheiro concluded that in an operational environment characterized by insurgence violence, terrorism, and political and religious extremism, IW serves as a valid model for not only SOF but all conventional supporting or supported forces involved.

*Dr. Mike Vlahos—Validity of IW as a Model*

Dr. Vlahos suggested that the two periods when nonstate actors challenged nation states were during late antiquity (5th-7th centuries) and early modernity (13th-15th centuries). During these periods, the established world system was in flux. Established authorities were losing power while new identities were rising. Three reasons for the salience and success of rising nonstate actors during these times follow:

- a. Established nation state losing military effectiveness
- b. Rising power of nonstate actors
- c. Capacity of nonstate actors to better employ technology developments.

It was nation states and their military forces that shaped the rule sets of war over the centuries. The rules were always rooted in the assumption that the enemy was “like us”—for example, that “legitimate” nation states go to war with other nation states. Now these rules cannot be applied to nonstate actors. This difficulty is partly due to the fact that in eras when nation states are supremely dominant, they could overwhelm nonstate entity with relative ease. However today, as in late antiquity and early modernity, our simply projecting nation state rule sets of war onto nonstate actors actually works in their favor—especially because we keep believing that these rule sets are the solution.

Not only can the nonstate enemy ignore our rules, he can turn our orthodoxies against us. Moreover, nonstate actors in eras of system

change have some special advantages. One is that they tend to be more united by their sense of identity, and this motivation is enhanced by their passionate commitment to it. Think of it as “identity power.” War for the nonstate actor is a celebration of identity. Their struggle is actually elevated by the narrative of their “mythical heroes versus the great evil.” Thus in helping them sacrifice themselves, we are building the new “river of their people,” a kind of collective passage through which sacred identity is realized.

Creative use of new technology does not mean that the nonstate actor will necessarily equal us on our terms—meaning, in our high-end weaponry and capabilities. But it is highly effective operationally, and it forms a collective motivation and reinforcement on one hand, and a path to potential *actual* victory as well. Consider current innovations—the Internet, cell phones, and improvised explosive devices: *perhaps the ultimate precision-guided ordnance*. Nonstate actors ultimately benefit from a much less rigid culture of war, which enables them to be consistently adaptive. We in contrast are locked into the technical solution, which is in the end no more than a massive expenditure of misplaced energy and effort. The solution is in the heart of the enemy and thus in our understanding of him.

Dr. Vlahos concluded that IW is a literary trope—a convention that serves our needs—but the reality is that what we are facing is only another form of war, which we are yet unwilling to understand.

## **Panel 2, *SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015***

*Moderator: Brigadier General Russ Howard (USA, Ret.)*

This panel addressed the inherent assumption that in 2007 we can influence SOF in 2015. Not surprisingly, the consensus was that we are already working within the constraints of the current Five Year Defense Program, and essentially we are already building and executing the programs that will exist in 2015.

*Colonel Walter Herd, USA—Strategic-Level Unconventional Warfare*

SOF is well postured to conduct UW at the tactical and operational levels. Colonel Herd’s assertion is that SOF needs to grow the tactical and operational level expertise to the strategic level. The U.S. is currently involved in a global unconventional war, but our unconventional warfare capabilities lie within a handful of U.S. Army Special Forces Groups. This essentially means that the expertise ends at the colonel/captain (O6) level, and no higher tactical or operational commands exist at the

general officer level, especially for Special Forces. The Special Forces general officer often ends up commanding organizations focused on the “service-like” responsibilities of USSOCOM. We need to develop them into strategic-level thinkers for UW.

Colonel Herd used an analogy to demonstrate his concept of strategic UW. He recalled the Mark Twain novel *Tom Sawyer* and how Tom was able to accomplish his goal of painting the fence—a classical example of strategic UW. Tom identified the main effort within his resources that got the local kids to do the work and accomplish the goal in less time with less effort. In IW, we need to get the indigenous people to “paint their own fence.” Identifying that main effort requires strategic UW thinking; the goal is to successfully work by, with, and through the indigenous people to accomplish the objectives.

*Colonel David Hopley (U.K. Royal Marines, Ret.)—Coalition Perspective in 2015*

Colonel Hopley discussed the coalition perspective for the future. In many ways, we have already put in motion the conditions and assets that will shape the environment in 2015. He gave several examples of what that environment could look like. The nuclear club will have expanded, and most likely Afghanistan and Iraq will still be battlefields.

We must understand the nature of the threat and how it changes. We also need to understand how we measure success in order to determine if we are winning. Colonel Hopley indicated that Europe is focused more on internal issues at home, not Iraq or Afghanistan. They face different threats, and the effect of the Iraq War on Europe is that most conclude: it is an “unjust war.” The cultural mixes are very different in Europe, and the immigrants have strong historical ties to the motherland. National identity is eroding and changing in Europe. In addition, the media and several nongovernmental organizations—for example the court of Human Rights—are changing opinions in Europe. Rising economical powers—such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China—could also cause the shifting of both economical and political power.

Regardless, the U.S. still has a powerful lead in technology, force structure, and communications. However, the danger is the “bar” may now be raised too high for effective interoperability in coalition operations, especially with respect to SOF. SOF must recognize what it does well and make those investments for the future. SOF should also be more like a shopping cart where you can select what you need for the task at hand. Interoperability across the spectrum of conflict will be vital.

*Colonel Ray Palumbo, USA—SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015 from the USSOCOM Perspective*

Modern SOF has undergone several epochs during its development according to Colonel Palumbo:

- a. The first period, classified as the “struggling years,” was from World War II until Desert One.
- b. The second epoch, a time of “gestation,” was from Desert One to the Nunn/Cohen Amendment.
- c. The next epoch was after the implementation of Nunn/Cohen in 1987 up to September 11, 2001 which was a “developmental” period.
- d. The current or fourth epoch, known as the “earning years,” started immediately after 9/11 and has continued as SOF fights the “long war” against terrorism.

What is ahead for SOF in 2015? Colonel Palumbo described what he thought would be the similarities and differences between now and 2015, assuming that SOF remains in the fourth epoch. USSOCOM’s role in the GWOT will remain unchanged. Likewise, USSOCOM’s strategy on the GWOT will probably remain the same. The mission of SOF, its core tasks, its standards, and the SOF truths will also be unchanged he believes. A final similarity will be the size of the force and the fact that SOF will continue to be a low density/high demand asset.

The differences between now and 2015 are several changes in the global posture of SOF, which should include less SOF in the Central Command’s area of responsibility. USSOCOM’s “synchronization” role in the GWOT will be more mature, including more interagency and intelligence savvy. Finally, by 2015, the Global Counterterrorism Network will be more developed and mature.

After a review of USSOCOM’s mission, SOF core tasks, and SOF truths that remain unchanged, a discussion developed around the “growth of SOF.” The size or numbers do not change significantly, even after the transfer of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations to the Army Reserve. Growth will occur with the addition of the Marine Special Operations Command as well as growth in the other components and the USSOCOM headquarters. What changes is the educational process for the future joint SOF warrior, who will be prepared for global expeditionary employment with the ability to synchronize operational and strategic activities.

In the future, joint SOF warriors must possess the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems and produce coherent options. SOF must not only train for discrete skill development and employment but also receive educational and experience opportunities for multiple skill comprehension, synthesis, and application at the operational and strategic levels of this global war. A twofold projection of the envisioned joint SOF warrior of the future follows:

- a. Will be far more diverse in capability, education, training, ethnicity, age, and other characteristics.
- b. Will be proficient in *interagency* and *international* relationships and increasingly capable of operating for extended periods of time in diverse regions of the world.

Colonel Palumbo reviewed the current USSOCOM strategy for the GWOT. This framework takes into account the friendly capability, the enemies' capability and intent, and the environment in which we fight. The key is to influence the environment, as part of a U.S. Government effort, to ultimately dominate the enemy. The two means are shaping and stabilizing activities so that our long-term efforts are more effective and creating an environment that is conducive to the friendly force (U.S. Government and partners) actions. Working along multiple lines of operations, the focus will be on both the direct and indirect approaches.

Colonel Palumbo concluded with a discussion on the Joint Special Operations Group concept that is designed to support the strategy and be more expeditionary in nature. This goal would include validating requirements during the global synchronization conference, then building and deploying the rotational force for each theater based on the validated purpose and rotational force capabilities. This focus would better support the Geographical Combatant Command with a well trained, prepared, and tailored force.

*Colonel Chris Sorenson, USA—Should SOF Operate Inside the Homeland?*

Colonel Sorenson posed an interesting question: "Should SOF operate inside the homeland to defeat a determined enemy?" If so, what should that role be? Today, the U.S. faces an extremist enemy who has identified the U.S. as the "far enemy" and has fixed their sites on attacking the homeland. Al Qaeda's multiphase plan may put the homeland at danger with proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (e.g.,

improvised explosive devices and perhaps even weapons of mass destruction). Likewise, current terrorist networks who aspire to Al Qaeda's vision may not wait for orders.

Colonel Sorenson expanded on the 911 Commission's "Failure of Imagination" finding by providing some recent examples within the U.S. and their effects on the American populace. Using the "DC Sniper" and previous data suggesting homegrown cells as examples, Colonel Sorenson postulated: If multiple events occurred as part of a sustained improvised-explosive-device campaign, could law enforcement respond to rapidly defeat the threat and at what point does the DoD provide assistance to civilian authorities? He has a twofold belief:

- a. The national Center of Gravity will be one of the government's skills to secure its people.
- b. We must preserve this Center of Gravity with all elements of national power as it is the enemy's key objective.

The current National Response Plan is a good tool for reacting to "an event" but is not proactive enough to quickly defeat a determined enemy with many attacks over a broad area. The mindset within DoD is that the military's role in the homeland is focused on civil support. However, historically the military has operated in the homeland, executing different roles during different periods. Colonel Sorenson believes that this new period of our nation is no different. A future attack on the nation will likely result in a response that will employ all elements of national power. The military is appropriate to defeat a military attack once it is recognized as such, which could take some time. SOF in particular has perfected man-hunting in a foreign environment; and these tactics, techniques, and procedures could be used in the domestic environment. This role could be for SOF, especially if a sustained campaign by our enemies exhausts Department of Justice and state and local law-enforcement resources.

To determine a role for SOF in defense of the homeland will require shaping perceptions and exercising integration to assuage law enforcement and public concerns. The framers of the U.S. Constitution and congressional action have traditionally limited the role of the federal military forces in the enforcement of U.S. laws. Nevertheless, the military has some expressed constitutional and congressional authority to enforce these laws under exigent circumstances. When these conditions exist, the President has several authorities to employ DoD inside the homeland, and the military is prepared by oath to support and defend against all enemies, foreign and "domestic." Al Qaeda has a



plan and promises to attack the homeland as soon as preparations are ready, but inspired organizations already inside the homeland may not adhere to an external authority. Therefore, it is prudent to assume that we do not have the luxury of time to define the role of DoD and its SOF in defense of the homeland.

**Brigadier General Les Fuller (USA, Ret.), Keynote Address: *The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW***

Brigadier General Fuller provided a personal account of his experiences in the interagency and coalition operations. During his introduction, he set the stage for his subsequent discussion via two points of interest:

- a. All SOF operations are IW by nature. Moreover, SOF missions involve the interagency process.
- b. Changing definitions results in confusion. Even though the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a definition, not everyone knows it. In fact the National Security Strategy document—published in the same month as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review—and the National Military Strategy Plan for the War of Terrorism do not mention IW.

Brigadier General Fuller defined IW as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Inherently a protracted conflict will test the resolve of a nation and its partners. Recalling the DoD definition of IW, Brigadier General Fuller reminded the audience that IW is about people and the underlying economic, political, and cultural or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population. As a result, he said, a U.S. Government agency other than the DoD will often lead IW, and that fact is contained in the IW Joint Operations Concept.

SOF are successful because they try to understand the dynamics of the operational environment and account for social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and physical conditions. SOF try hard to understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of both partners and adversaries. While IW poses significant challenges for the joint forces, we must remember that our irregular partners and our adversaries both possess significant capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Brigadier General Fuller provided a series of personal vignettes dealing with the interagency, coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and international governmental organizations in Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Stabilization Force, NATO Kosovo Force, and NATO in Afghanistan. Some key issues that were common in these operations were stovepipe missions; lack of cross talk; and different cultures, missions, and rotation cycles. These issues resulted in some problems identified with interagency operations:

- a. Lack of culture and/or capacity for planning in some agencies
- b. Lack of capabilities for deploying and sustaining their expertise abroad
- c. Lack of adequate institutional linkages or mechanisms for coordinated planning at operational levels across departments and agencies.

The fix is clearly to appoint a lead agency; however, with agencies having different chains of command, priorities, and resources, the challenge is how to synchronize everything and get all parties on one team.

Brigadier General Fuller offered some thoughts on the “keys to victory” in the interagency. These include the requirement for a common picture of our operations, information sharing, a decision-making process, speed of operations, and finally having like or similar priorities. He also shared that each agency has a different mission and way of doing business, and their way is not wrong just because it is different. Interagency groups need to apply procedures through which inputs are converted into outputs. He offered some key challenges to be met:

- a. Improving horizontal and vertical integration
- b. Establishing the legitimacy of decision makers below the President
- c. Building departmental capabilities for operational planning and execution
- d. Institutionalizing interagency expertise
- e. Integrating agency cultures
- f. Overcoming the mistrust between the agencies.

How do we strengthen the interagency process? Some suggestions are to keep talking and avoid pointing fingers. Allow time for action between agencies and get them on the team by integrating efforts with

liaison teams. Build teamwork and share the glory—let them win too. And more specifically for SOF, use UW traits on these agencies to understand their “culture,” “language,” and “processes.”

Brigadier General Fuller said the combatant commanders and their staffs are working exceedingly hard to develop an IW campaign that synchronizes all available instruments of national power and partner capabilities. However, much more work needs to be accomplished. He posed a number of questions for symposium participants to consider:

- a. How do we conduct horizontal coordination? How do we functionally pull this together?
- b. Is a single interagency system where we need to go?
- c. Do we need a super National Security Council to coordinate this?
- d. Is a Goldwater-Nichols-like event needed to make the inter-agency system work?
- e. How could Congress write the act to make this happen?

### **Panel 3, *The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW***

*Moderator: Colonel Jim Powers (USA, Ret.)*

The third panel focused on the interagency process, the relationship with and applicability to IW. Each of the panel members provided their insights on the interagency and how well it is or is not working. They also discussed a number of recommendations about SOF’s interaction within the interagency and how to improve the process.

*Ms. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty—National Coordinator for Transnational Threats and the Counterterrorism Security Group*

Ms. Gordon-Hagerty shared experiences from working within the National Security Council staff and observing the dynamics of the interagency process. She explained that national security is all about leadership, taking responsibility, and doing the right thing. It requires coordination based on an established common goal, mission, or end state. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty also stated that the U.S. Government has been working the interagency combating terrorism process very well for many years. The National Security Council established the Committee on Transnational Threats, which includes the following members:

- a. Director of Central Intelligence
- b. Secretary of State
- c. Secretary of Defense
- d. Attorney General

- e. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who serves as the committee chairperson
- f. Others as the President may designate.

The function of the committee is to coordinate and direct the activities of the U.S. Government relating to combating transnational threats. These activities include identifying transnational threats, developing strategies to enable the U.S. Government to respond to transnational threats identified, monitoring implementation of such strategies, and ultimately recommending appropriate responses to specific transnational threats. This structure shows the combating terrorism community having a common goal and directed focus—the “coordinating subgroup” or “counterterrorism security group.”

When Ms. Gordon-Hagerty worked within the National Security Council staff, the U.S. had a national coordinator for transnational threats; the current administration decided that the “counterterrorism czar” was not needed for a variety of reasons. The lack of this role, however, tended to weaken the interagency effort for combating terrorism. The current search for a high powered czar to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with authority to issue directions to the Pentagon, Department of State, and other agencies highlights the need for this role to return. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty concluded by stressing again that it is all about leadership, taking responsibility, and doing the right thing.

*Ambassador Tim Foster—Interagency and the Country Team*

Ambassador Foster began his remarks by positing that at Department of State (DoS), IW refers to the way other agencies engage in the interagency process. He suggested that interagency cooperation in establishing DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) illustrated that view. He noted that based on U.S. experience in Iraq in 2003-2004, a twofold consensus developed among key policy makers in Washington:

- a. The U.S. Government needed a more robust capability to manage stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries emerging from conflict.
- b. The responsibility for coordinating U.S. Government efforts in that regard properly belonged to DoS.

In July 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to create S/CRS. The idea was that S/CRS would be a DoS office but interagency in character and function. Its interagency partners were

to include the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USJFCOM, ASD SO/LIC, and the Army Corps of Engineers from DoD, plus other agencies, including the CIA, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

This arrangement was codified in December 2005 with the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, entitled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 specified that DoS shall coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

So what happened? Ambassador Foster asked, noting that after all, stabilization and reconstruction are crucial elements of indirect action in the GWOT, and they are key areas of the SOF mission. He answered that from the beginning, interagency participation and support was uneven, and funding problems were severe. Consequently, S/CRS got off to a shaky start. While DoS is well-equipped to handle the policy coordination role, it does not have the personnel, skill sets, or resources to implement stabilization and reconstruction on the ground. USAID has those tools to some degree, but DoD is currently best equipped to do that job. However, he ventured that the U.S. Government is still wrestling with those roles and responsibilities and arguing over who staffs Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.

Ambassador Foster said that no experienced government hand maintains that interagency collaboration is easy. It involves battle over turf and requires constant effort, all the more so inside the Beltway. He added, however, that some agencies protect their turf by not fully engaging in the process or by circumventing it. During the first 6 years of the Bush administration, the interagency process had not worked well when it concerned DoS and DoD.

Ambassador Foster suggested it was more meaningful for SOF participants in the symposium to move away from the Beltway and discuss the interagency process in the field at the Embassy Country Team level, where the process veers from the civics textbook version somewhat less than in Washington.

He noted that American embassies are the front line for the GWOT in countries that are not combat zones, and SOF are increasingly deployed to noncombat zone countries, most frequently in Joint and Combined Exercises for Training, Joint Planning and Assistance Teams, and as Military Liaison Elements. Embassies normally

welcome SOF with open arms because they have the reputation of being mature professionals, and they bring counterterrorism assets to the embassy and capacity-building resources to the host nation.

Ambassador Foster explained that the composition of the Country Team, composed of agency and section heads, varies widely by the size of the mission. He stressed that each Country Team is different because it is a chemistry of personalities peculiar to itself. He said that the most important Country Team members from the SOF perspective are the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission and the DoD representative, usually the Defense Attaché (DAT) but sometimes the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) chief.

He encouraged SOF liaison officers not to limit their contact to the DAT or ODC chief but network with all members of the Country Team with counterterrorism responsibilities. That would include, among others, the political officer with the counterterrorism portfolio, the economic officer with the counterterrorism finance and civil aviation portfolios, the Regional Security Officer, who liaises with the police and has force protection responsibilities, the Legal Attaché if there is one, and the Consular Officer, who manages the visa watch list.

Ambassador Foster stressed that it was in SOF's interest to ensure ambassadors understand what SOF brings to the table, which is why USSOCOM hosts ambassadorial orientation programs several times a year.

*Mr. Prakash Singh—Insurgencies in India's North-East*

Mr. Singh gave his perspective of problems that police and security forces face in India's North-East. He discussed the root causes of several ongoing insurgencies in the areas of Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, and Assam:

- a. Union Government's alleged neglect of the area
- b. Feeling of alienation among the various tribal groups
- c. Changes in the demographic pattern of the traditional tribal areas caused by influx of people from across the borders
- d. Assistance provided to rebel groups by countries inimical to India
- e. Availability of sanctuaries in those bordering countries.

Concerning the government's strategy, Mr. Singh believes they must meet the political aspirations of the ethnic groups. Specifically, they must give them some degree of autonomy and improve governance. Next, economic development of the area would help reduce

dissatisfaction. Finally, engaging the various insurgent outfits in peace dialogues and coordinating operations with the neighboring countries would reduce the insurgents' capabilities and reach.

Mr. Singh felt that the reasons for continued unrest in the North-East were varied:

- a. Tribal groups believe that political concessions are given because of weakness within the Government of India.
- b. Widespread corruption among ruling elite, which exists within the regional area, is complimented by active involvement of foreign intelligence agencies and services.
- c. Neighboring countries permit insurgent groups to set up training camps, allowing them to buy/procure arms and supply the same insurgent groups.

*Colonel Bob Stephan (USAF, Ret.)—National Critical Infrastructure*

Colonel Stephan discussed four major topics: the genesis of national infrastructure protection, the GWOT and risk management, and the role of SOF. The defense of U.S. infrastructure began during World War II, evolved during the threat of thermonuclear war in the 1950s, and mostly relied on the private sector until President Clinton's administration. His Presidential Decision Directive 63 established eight critical national infrastructure categories and described a partnership between the Federal Government, state governments, and the private sector. Several key categories were not included—for example, food, agriculture, and dams. Now there are 17 critical infrastructure categories.

Critical infrastructure protection is difficult, requiring coalitions and partners. Budgets are tight across the board, which requires one to set priorities for resources. Because one cannot protect everything, a risk-based approach is required. Colonel Stephan remarked that being a "no fail operation," the focus is on determining the priorities and where critical infrastructure protection is needed. The threat is especially hard to predict. The enemy is decentralized and can make bombs out of very common materials. In essence, what we need to protect is very vulnerable and ubiquitous. Consequently, what is required is a "coalition of the willing"; in fact, about 85 percent of the effort will have to be voluntary through the private sector. There are many governmental agencies involved in the effort, but they have different cultures and never had to work together prior to 9/11. The combined effort will require leadership at all levels, in both the private and public sectors to have a unity of effort. Finally, it will require risk-based adaptive planning.



How can SOF help? First, continue the fight overseas. The GWOT is not going away; it is going to be generational. DoD needs to adapt and not worry about a peer competitor. Next, continue the liaison with other governmental agencies. It helps those other agencies in adapting technology, planning, and solutions. Although no direct payback to SOF exists, a payback awaits the nation. No one in the government can compete with SOF's "brain power." The lessons learned on the battlefield provide experience that cannot be replicated.

### **Breakout Groups**

The concept of breakout groups was introduced in this year's symposium. It afforded the opportunity for the three panels to discuss their thoughts on the panel topic in a small seminar atmosphere. It also allowed for participants to be more involved in the discussions and questions, the sharing of insights, and topics for continued research.

### **Vice Admiral Eric Olson (USN), Keynote Address: *SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015***

VADM Olson addressed the symposium via video teleconference from Washington, D.C. He spoke on the evolution of the IW concept within the Pentagon and the importance of the ongoing dialogue on IW. He also discussed the impact of the Quadrennial Defense Review on USSOCOM and the services, including the resulting growth of USSOCOM.

### **Luncheon Speakers**

*Colonel Thomas Hammes (USMC, Ret.)*

Colonel Hammes offered views on the new (fourth) generation of guerrilla warfare. That is what American forces are encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan today and is the way of the future. Essentially, it is guerrilla warfare characterized by political aspects executed over a long period of time, using communications networks, cell phones, and the Internet as tools to demoralize conventional superior military states. It is not about smart bombs and spy drones but rather studying the enemy and building a flexible, network-like structure for the military focusing on humans.

*Dr. John Alexander, PhD. (Colonel, USA, Ret.)*

Dr. Alexander discussed his perspectives on the GWOT and the changing nature of war. His view is that the nature of war has changed at the most fundamental level—the definition of war. With "wars" on



various topics (e.g., poverty, drugs, cancer), we have lost the essential meaning. Dr. Alexander provided ideas on the types of future armed conflicts that include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, massive civil disobedience, direct combat, and “a sea change in the perception of winning.” The shift will be from wars of annihilation to wars for ideological dominance. Dr. Alexander also concluded that two global conflicts have already begun, one ideological and one economic. In conclusion, he stated that war is about imposing will, not necessarily about killing.

### Summary/Next Steps

The Second Annual JSOU Symposium was a success from the standpoint of sharing information and insights from senior government officials and panelists. Participants gained an appreciation for the complexity of the threats we are facing and the ramifications of U.S. and partner nation courses of action against these complex threats. As with most events of this type, much was accomplished outside of the agenda activities as new relationships were forged.

This JSOU summary of presentations and discussions provides the following benefits:

- a. Serves as a record for those in attendance and a baseline for further discussion.
- b. Informs those who could not participate about what transpired and invites them to join the dialogue among colleagues on topics covered.
- c. Facilitates briefing senior SOF leaders about the topics and encourages them to consider key concepts as they develop future plans and operations.

JSOU appreciates the support of the senior and associate fellows and friends who contributed to the success of this symposium through their presentations and participation in the strategy debate.

### JSOU Symposium 2008

The third annual symposium will be held 28 April – 2 May 2008 at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The proposed theme for the 2008 event is “SOF in Today’s Complex Environment: Indirect Approaches and Strategies in Irregular Warfare.” ↑